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Abstract
Prosocial incentive can promote cooperation, but providing incentive is
costly. Institutions in human society may prefer to use an incentive strat-
egy which is able to promote cooperation at a reasonable cost. However,
thus far few works have explored the optimal institutional incentives which
minimize related cost for the benefit of public cooperation. In this work,
in combination with optimal control theory we thus formulate two optimal
control problems to explore the optimal incentive strategies for institutional
reward and punishment respectively. By using the approach of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation for well-mixed populations, we theoretically obtain
the optimal positive and negative incentive strategies with the minimal cu-
mulative cost respectively. Additionally, we provide numerical examples to
verify that the obtained optimal incentives allow the dynamical system to
reach the desired destination at the lowest cumulative cost in comparison
with other given incentive strategies. Furthermore, we find that the optimal
punishing strategy is a cheaper way for obtaining an expected cooperation
level when it is compared with the optimal rewarding strategy.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is of vital importance in the contemporary era and identified
as an essential principle of evolution [1, 2, 3]. However, self-regarding indi-
viduals constantly strive to maximize their own personal benefit which would
inevitably lead to the collapse of cooperation, in the scenario where what is
best for the collectivity is at odds with what is best for an individual. This
is referred to as social dilemma of cooperation [4, 5, 6, 7], which has received
considerable attention in recent years [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. To overcome this conflict social institutions
frequently apply two control mechanisms, that is, rewards (positive incen-
tives) for cooperation [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38] and punishments
(negative incentives) for defection [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49].
In theory, cooperative behavior will occur as long as the amount of in-
centives outweighs the payoff difference between cooperators and defectors
no matter whether incentive is positive or negative. However, executing an
incentive strategy into the system is costly and the cumulative costs for dif-
ferent incentive strategies could be significantly different. This observation
has inspired several studies to explore efficient incentive strategies for the
evolution of cooperation at a low cost [32, 34, 35, 36]. Recently, Sasaki et al.
have introduced institutional positive and negative incentives into the public
goods dilemma respectively and found that social dilemma of cooperation
can be overcome by both institutional punishment and reward. More inter-
estingly, they have found that institutional punishment can overcome social
dilemma at a much lower cost with the help of optimal participation [35].
Subsequently, Chen et al. have proposed an optimal incentive strategy in
combination with institutional punishment and reward, called “first carrot,
then stick”, which is able to unexpectedly succeed in promoting coopera-
tion. Furthermore they also demonstrated that the “first carrot, then stick”
strategy makes full cooperation established and recovered at lower cost under
wider range of conditions than either reward or punishment alone no matter
well-mixed or spatially structured populations are considered [34]. Neverthe-
less, it is worth pointing out that these previous works fixed the per capita
incentive, which is an important parameter determining the cumulative cost
during the evolutionary process, and they focused on the dominant low-cost
incentive strategy. In other words, they did not explore the optimal incentive
strategy with the minimal cumulative cost for institutional punishment or re-
ward, and thus it remained unclear the specific forms of optimal incentive
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strategies with the minimal cost for the evolution of cooperation when the
per capita incentive is considered as a control variable.
Recently, optimal control theory [50, 51, 52] has been introduced to study
evolutionary game dynamics [53, 54, 55], which seems to be an alternative
approach for studying the optimal incentive strategy with the minimal cost
for the evolution of cooperation. For example Griffin and Belmonte have
studied the problem of designing an optimal success tax in a three-species
public goods game and formulated the problem as an optimal control problem
[53]. Furthermore Bravetti and Padilla have introduced an extension of the
replicator equation, called the optimal replicator equation, by using optimal
control theory [54]. Additionally Wang et al. have studied the problem
of designing reward and compensation control strategies for promoting the
evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game [55]. However, it is
worth mentioning that these previous works do not involve the investigation
of the optimal incentive strategies with the minimal cumulative cost for the
evolution of cooperation, and thus it could be interesting to study the optimal
strategies of institutional incentives by using optimal control theory.
In this work, we thus consider the per capita incentive as the control vari-
able in the replicator equation for the public goods game with institutional
punishment or reward and aim to explore the optimal control protocols for the
control variable in well-mixed populations. Based on optimal control theory,
we set a cost function as the objective functional and formulate two optimal
control problems for institutional reward and punishment respectively. By
using the approach of Hamilton-Jacobin-Bellman equation (HJB equation)
[50, 51, 52], we theoretically obtain the specific optimal control protocols for
institutional punishment and reward respectively such that the set objective
functional is minimized, i.e., the cumulative cost amount is minimized. We
find that the optimal control incentive strategy with the minimal cumulative
cost can make the system converge to the homogeneous state of full coopera-
tion. In addition, we provide numerical examples to respectively confirm that
the amount of cumulative cost for the optimal control strategy of positive
(negative) incentive is lowest when comparing with other given protocols of
positive (negative) incentives. We further find that the amount of cumulative
cost for the obtained optimal negative incentive strategy is lower than that
for the obtained optimal positive incentive strategy in almost all the initial
conditions.
3
2. Model and methods
2.1. Public goods game with dynamic incentives
Our model is based on the public goods game (PGG) in an infinitely large,
well-mixed population, in which each individual can choose to cooperate or
defect. In the game, individuals are randomly selected from the population
to form a n-player group with n ≥ 2. In the formed group, each cooperator
contributes the fixed amount of investment c > 0 to the common pool, while
a defector contributes nothing. The total investments to the pool are then
multiplied by a synergy factor r > 1 and allocated equally among all the n
group members. The social dilemma arises when r < n and nobody prefers
to cooperate if no external incentive mechanism is considered [35].
The basic model can be extended by institutional incentives [34, 35]. We
assume that apart from the payoffs originated from the PGG, each group
receives the total incentives stipulated by an institution in the form nu to
be used either for rewarding cooperators or for punishing defectors, where
u (u > 0) is the per capita incentive. If the total incentives are used for
rewarding, each cooperator obtains a reward anu/(nC +1), where nC denotes
the number of cooperators among the other n − 1 players and the factor a
denotes the leverage of rewarding [34]. Accordingly, a cooperator receives
the payoff
ΠC =
rc(nC + 1)
n
− c+ anu
nC + 1
,
while a defector in the same group receives
ΠD =
rcnC
n
.
If the total incentives are used for punishing defectors, individuals who
defect have their payoff reduced by bnu/(nD + 1), where b characterizes the
leverage of punishment [34] and nD denotes the number of defectors among
the other n− 1 group members. Accordingly, a defector receives
ΠD =
rcnC
n
− bnu
nD + 1
,
payoff, while a cooperator in the same group receives
ΠC =
rc(nC + 1)
n
− c.
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In the present work we consider rewarding and punishing in isolation and
assume that the total incentives can be only used for rewarding or punishing
like Ref. [35]. But differently, we assume that the per capita incentive is not
fixed, and can be adjusted during the evolutionary process. We then aim
to explore the optimal control protocols of u for institutional reward and
punishment respectively. For the sake of proper comparison, we assume that
a = b = 1 in this work.
2.2. Replicator equation
We then use the replicator equation to study how the frequencies of dif-
ferent strategies alter in infinitely large, well-mixed populations. Here, we
suppose a large population, a fraction x of which encompasses cooperators,
and the remaining fraction 1−x being defectors. In consequence, the system
of replicator equation can be written as [56]
x˙ = x(1− x)(pC − pD), (1)
where the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors can be respectively
given as
pi =
n−1∑
nC=0
(
n− 1
nC
)
xnC (1− x)nDΠi, (i = C or D). (2)
When institutional reward is used, the average payoffs of cooperators and
defectors can be respectively written as [31, 35]
pC =
rc[1 + (n− 1)x]
n
− c+ u1− (1− x)
n
x
,
and
pD =
rc(n− 1)x
n
.
Accordingly, the replicator equation becomes
x˙ = x(1− x)[u1− (1− x)
n
x
− (n− r)c
n
]. (3)
Whereas when institutional punishment is used, the average payoffs of
cooperators and defectors can be respectively written as [31, 35]
pC =
rc[1 + (n− 1)x]
n
− c,
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and
pD =
rcx(n− 1)
n
− u1− x
n
1− x .
Accordingly, the replicator equation becomes
x˙ = x(1− x)[u1− x
n
1− x −
(n− r)c
n
]. (4)
2.3. Optimal control problems of incentive strategies
In theory, cooperative behavior will occur as long as the amount of in-
centives outweights the payoff difference between cooperators and defectors,
no matter whether incentive is positive or negative. But implementing in-
centives is costly and thus we aim to explore the optimal control protocols of
u with the minimal amount of cumulative cost for implementing incentives.
To do that, we first define a cost function as the objective functional, which
is given as
J =
∫ tf
t0
(nu)2
2
dt, (5)
where t0 is the initial time and tf is the terminal time for the system. In
our work, the initial time is t0 = 0. Based on the above definition, we can
then explore the optimal incentive strategies during the evolutionary period
between 0 and tf using optimal control theory [50, 51, 52]. We consider
that tf is not fixed, but the fraction of cooperators at tf is fixed at x(tf ).
Considering the promotion effects of institutional incentives on cooperation,
we further assume that x(tf ) = 1−δ > x0, where δ is a parameter determining
the cooperation level at the terminal time satisfying 0 ≤ δ < 1, and x0 is the
initial cooperation level in the population.
Based on the above description, we now formulate the two following op-
timal control problems for institutional reward and punishment respectively.
For institutional reward, we have
min J =
∫ tf
0
(nu)2
2
dt,
s.t.
 x˙ = x(1− x)[u
1−(1−x)n
x
− (n−r)c
n
],
x(0) = x0,
x(tf ) = 1− δ.
(6)
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Analogously, for institutional punishment we have
min J =
∫ tf
0
(nu)2
2
dt,
s.t.
 x˙ = x(1− x)[u
1−xn
1−x − (n−r)cn ],
x(0) = x0,
x(tf ) = 1− δ.
(7)
Here the cost function J characterizes the cumulative cost of one interaction
group on average during the period [0, tf ] for the dynamical system described
by the replicator equation starting from the initial state x0 to the terminal
state 1 − δ. Thus the quantity min J can work as the performance index of
calculating the optimal control protocol of u with the minimal cumulative
cost in a well-mixed population. In what follows, we will use optimal control
theory, especially the approach of HJB equation [50, 51, 52], to solve the
two optimal control problems. Specifically, we aim to study whether there
exist the optimal control protocols of u which can make the cost function
minimized and what their expressions are if exist.
3. Results
3.1. Optimal control strategy of positive incentive
Using the approach of HJB equation, we can theoretically obtain the
optimal control strategy for institutional reward u∗R(t) as (for more detailed
theoretical calculations see Appendix A)
u∗R(t) =
2(n− r)c
n
x
1− (1− x)n . (8)
Accordingly, with the optimal control strategy u∗R(t), the dynamical sys-
tem described by Eq. (3) becomes
x˙ =
(n− r)c
n
x(1− x), (9)
where the initial condition is x(0) = x0.
Solving the above differential equation, we have
x(t) =
1
1 + ( 1
x0
− 1)e− (n−r)cn t
. (10)
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators for three different rewarding strate-
gies including u∗R(t), u(t) = 0.5, and u(t) = 40(1− x). The inset table shows the amounts
of cumulative cost for the three different rewarding strategies. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3,
c = 1, δ = 0.01, and x0 = 0.5.
In order to confirm the above theoretical results for u∗R(t), we would like to
provide some numerical examples in what follows. Before that, we point out
how to compute the amount of cumulative cost for a given control protocol of
u. When the initial state and the terminal state are given, we first determine
the value of tf based on Eq. (3). We can then obtain the cumulative cost
amount using Eq. (5). However, when δ is set to zero, that is, when the
terminal state is x(tf ) = 1, we find that for some given control protocols of u
the system needs to take an infinitely long time to reach the terminal state
x(tf ) = 1. In this case, we determine the value of tf by considering the δ
value is sufficiently small, i.e., δ → 0.
In Fig. 1, we show the fraction of cooperators as a function of time for the
obtained optimal rewarding strategy u∗R(t) and two other given rewarding
strategies u(t) = 0.5 and u(t) = 40(1 − x). We find that all these three
rewarding strategies can make the dynamical system reach the terminal state
and eventually converge to the full cooperation state. But the optimal u∗R(t)
does not lead to the fastest increase of the fraction of cooperators at the
early stage of evolution. Notably, from the inset table of Fig. 1 we find that
the amount of cumulative cost for the system to reach the expected terminal
state x(tf ) = 0.99 from the initial state x0 = 0.5 is about 68.57 for u
∗
R(t),
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which is lowest when it is compared with the other two cost values. Thus
our numerical calculations support our theoretical results and confirm that
the obtained control protocol u∗R(t) is superior and dominates other control
protocols in the cost of implementing positive incentives.
3.2. Optimal control strategy of negative incentive
Similarly, using the approach of HJB equation we can theoretically obtain
the optimal control strategy for institutional punishment u∗P (t) as (for more
detailed theoretical calculations please see Appendix B)
u∗P (t) =
2(n− r)c
n
(1− x)
1− xn . (11)
Accordingly, with the optimal control strategy u∗P (t), the dynamical sys-
tem described by Eq. (4) becomes
x˙ =
(n− r)c
n
x(1− x), (12)
where the initial condition is x(0) = x0.
Solving the above differential equation, we have
x(t) =
1
1 + ( 1
x0
− 1)e− (n−r)cn t
. (13)
In order to confirm the above theoretical results, we present some numer-
ical calculations as shown in Fig. 2. We show that the fraction of cooperators
as a function of time for the obtained optimal punishing strategy u∗P (t) and
two other given punishing strategies u(t) = 0.5 and u(t) = 9(1 − x). We
find that all these three punishing strategies can make the dynamical system
reach the desired terminal state and eventually converge to the full cooper-
ation state, but the optimal u∗P (t) makes the slowest increase in cooperation
level at the early stage of evolution among the three protocols. Noticeably,
we still find that the amount of cumulation cost for the system to reach the
terminal state x(tf ) = 0.99 from the initial state x0 = 0.5 for the strategy
u∗P (t) is about 7.79, which is lower than the other two cost values, as illus-
trated by the inset table of Fig. 2. Thus our numerical calculations confirm
that the obtained control protocol u∗P (t) is better than other control protocols
in the cost of implementing negative incentives and support our theoretical
predictions.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators for three different punishing strate-
gies including u∗P (t), u(t) = 0.5, and u(t) = 9(1− x). The inset table shows the amounts
of cumulative cost for the three different punishing strategies. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3,
c = 1, δ = 0.01, and x0 = 0.5.
3.3. Comparison between optimal positive and negative incentive strategies
Finally, we are interested in making a comparison between the optimal
rewarding strategy u∗R(t) and the optimal punishing strategy u
∗
P (t). Surpris-
ingly and interestingly, we find that no matter whether the optimal strategy
u∗R(t) or u
∗
P (t) is used, the dynamical system will become the identical equa-
tion x˙ = c(n − r)x(1 − x)/n. This means that both the optimal rewarding
and punishing strategies can not only make the dynamical system converge
to the full cooperation state, but also have the same value of tf and the same
evolutionary trajectory if the model parameter values are identical. However,
due to the expression difference of u∗R(t) and u
∗
P (t) we can predict that the
two cumulative cost amounts should be different.
In order to have a clear distinction between the two cumulative cost
amounts in different conditions, we thus show the cumulative cost values
as a function of the initial cooperation level for u∗R(t) and u
∗
P (t), as presented
in Fig. 3. We can observe that the cumulative cost monotonically decreases
with increasing the initial cooperation level for both optimal positive and
negative incentive strategies. In addition, we find that the cumulative cost
value of the optimal punishing strategy is lower than that of the optimal
rewarding strategy for almost all the x0 values. This indicates that both the
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Figure 3: The required cumulative cost as a function of the initial state x0 for the optimal
rewarding and punishing strategies. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, and δ = 0.01.
optimal rewarding and punishing strategies can make the system reach the
same terminal state from the same initial state, but the latter requires less
cost. From this viewpoint, the optimal punishing strategy is better than the
optimal rewarding strategy.
4. Discussion
Prosocial incentive can always promote cooperation, but implementing
incentive is costly [57, 58, 59, 60]. From the viewpoint of optimization, in-
stitutions prefer to adopt the incentive strategy which is able to not only
promote cooperation, but also require a low cost [34, 35]. In this work, by
combining optimal control theory and evolutionary game approach, we have
thus studied two optimal control problems of institutional incentives in a well-
mixed population to explore the optimal rewarding and punishing strategies
respectively. By using the method of HJB equation, we theoretically ob-
tain the optimal rewarding and punishing strategies respectively, which can
make the cumulative cost minimized and make the dynamical system reach
the desired terminal state. Additionally, we provide numerical examples to
respectively compare the obtained optimal incentive strategies with other
given incentive ones which further confirm our theoretical results. Further-
more, when we compare the optimal rewarding strategy with the optimal
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punishing strategy, we find that the cumulative cost value for the former is
larger than that for the latter in almost all the possible initial conditions by
numerical calculations.
In this work, the dynamical system described by the replicator equation
is nonlinear, thus it is not easy to obtain the exact expression of the optimal
control protocols for institutional incentives in theory [53, 54, 55]. However,
by employing the approach of HJB equation for continuous-time systems,
we can succeed in theoretically obtaining the optimal control strategies for
institutional incentives. To our best knowledge this is the first time when
this dynamic programming method [50, 51, 52] is used in the framework of
evolutionary game system. Additionally, these theoretical results are verified
by numerical examples.
We find that both the optimal rewarding and punishing strategies can
make the dynamical system have the same evolutionary trajectory eventu-
ally converging to the full cooperation state, but the former requires less
cumulative cost than the latter. Indeed previous works reveal that institu-
tional punishment is a cheaper way of leading the system to reaching the
desired cooperation level than applying reward [35]. On the one hand, our
work thus further confirms this conclusion. On the other hand, however, our
work establishes a quantitative index characterizing how much cumulative
cost is needed for a given incentive strategy to make the system reach the
expected evolutionary destination. Thus, we can quantify how cheaper the
optimal punishing strategy is than the optimal rewarding strategy.
A previous work shows that prosocial punishment promotes cooperation,
but it does not increase the average payoff of individuals and even reduces
the average payoff in some cases [61]. Thus people gaining high payoff prefer
not to use punishment from the viewpoint of individual-level internal interac-
tions. But institutions, as a top-down-like control mechanism, may not tend
to enforce rewarding or punishing on individuals according to individual-level
internal interactions. Instead, since institutions need to pay for providing
incentives, policy-makers may prefer institutions which not only promote co-
operative behaviors, but also are much cheaper [62]. Thus our work provides
clear arguments why the use of punishment is preferred in human society.
For the above described reason our work only considers the optimal con-
trol problems to explore the optimal control strategies with the minimal
cumulative cost. Indeed, the time for the system to reach the desired state is
also an important quantity for the governance of the public goods [34, 63, 64].
Thus it could be interesting to consider the performance index of time as the
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objective functional into the optimal control problems of institutional incen-
tives as a possible extension. Work along this line is in progress.
Appendix A: Theoretical calculations of optimal rewarding strat-
egy
For solving the optimal control problem described by Eq. (6) to theoret-
ically obtain the optimal positive incentive strategy, we use the approach of
HJB equation [50, 51, 52]. To begin, we first define the function f(x, u, t) as
f(x, u, t) = x(1− x)[u1− (1− x)
n
x
− (n− r)c
n
]. (A1)
Here f(x, u, t) is a continuously differentiable function coming from the right-
hand part of Eq. (3) and u is the control variable about positive incentive.
Accordingly, we define the Hamiltonian function HR(x, u, t) for the equa-
tion system as
HR(x, u, t) =
(nu)2
2
+
∂J∗
∂x
f(x, u, t)
=
(nu)2
2
+ x(1− x)
[u
1− (1− x)n
x
− (n− r)c
n
]
∂J∗
∂x
, (A2)
where J∗(x, t) is the optimal cost function of x and t for the rewarding
strategy given as J∗(x, t) =
∫ tf
0
[nu∗R(t)]
2
2
dt.
Solving ∂HR
∂u
= 0, we know that the optimal positive incentive u∗R(t) should
satisfy
u∗R(t) = −
(1− x)[1− (1− x)n]
n2
∂J∗
∂x
. (A3)
In general, in order to obtain the optimal control protocol, we need to
solve the nonlinear canonical equations [50, 51, 52]. However, it is quite
difficult to solve the equations directly. Instead, we use the dynamic pro-
gramming method, HJB equation for continuous-time systems [50, 51, 52],
to solve the optimal control problem. Consequently, the HJB equation for
the dynamical system with positive incentive can be written as
−∂J
∗
∂t
= HR[x, u
∗
R(t), t].
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By substituting Eqs. (A2) and (A3) into the above HJB equation, we
have
−∂J
∗
∂t
= −(1− x)
2[1− (1− x)n]2
2n2
(
∂J∗
∂x
)2
− (n− r)c
n
x(1− x)∂J
∗
∂x
. (A4)
Since we assume that the terminal time tf is free, the optimal cost function
J∗(x, t) is independent of t. Consequently, we have
∂J∗
∂t
= 0. (A5)
We then yield from Eq. (A4)
∂J∗
∂x
= 0 or ∂J
∗
∂x
= − 2n(n−r)cx
(1−x)[1−(1−x)n]2 . (A6)
Since the per capita incentive u > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1), from Eq. (A3) we
have
∂J∗
∂x
< 0. (A7)
Therefore only ∂J
∗
∂x
= − 2n(n−r)cx
(1−x)[1−(1−x)n]2 holds. By substituting this equation
into Eq. (A3), we obtain the optimal rewarding strategy u∗R(t) as
u∗R(t) =
2(n− r)c
n
x
1− (1− x)n . (A8)
With the optimal rewarding strategy u∗R(t), the dynamical system thus
becomes
x˙ =
(n− r)c
n
x(1− x), (A9)
where the initial condition is x(0) = x0.
By solving Eq. (A9), we finally obtain the solution of x(t) with the optimal
rewarding strategy as
x(t) =
1
1 + ( 1
x0
− 1)e− (n−r)cn t
. (A10)
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Appendix B: Theoretical calculations of optimal punishing strategy
We solve the optimal control problem described by Eq. (7) to theoretically
obtain the optimal negative incentive strategy by using a similar calculation
described in Appendix A. To do that, we first define the function g(x, u, t)
as
g(x, u, t) = x(1− x)[u1− x
n
1− x −
(n− r)c
n
]. (B1)
Here g(x, u, t) is a continuously differentiable function coming from the right-
hand part of Eq. (4) and u is the control variable about negative incentive.
Accordingly, we define the Hamiltonian function HP (x, u, t) for the equa-
tion system as
HP (x, u, t) =
(nu)2
2
+
∂J∗
∂x
g[x(t), u(t), t]
=
(nu)2
2
+ ux(1− xn)∂J
∗
∂x
− (n− r)c
n
x(1− x)∂J
∗
∂x
, (B2)
where J∗(x, t) is the optimal cost function of x and t for the punishing strat-
egy given as J∗(x, t) =
∫ tf
0
[nu∗P (t)]
2
2
dt.
Solving ∂HP
∂u
= 0, we know that the optimal negative incentive u∗P (t)
should satisfy
u∗P (t) = −
x(1− xn)
n2
∂J∗
∂x
. (B3)
Similarly, we use the approach of HJB equation to obtain u∗P (t) by solving
Eq. (B3). And the HJB equation for the dynamical system with negative
incentive can be written as
−∂J
∗
∂t
= HP [x, u
∗
P (t), t].
By substituting Eqs. (B2) and (B3) into the above HJB equation, we have
− ∂J
∗
∂t
= −x
2(1− xn)2
2n2
(
∂J∗
∂x
)2 − (n− r)c
n
x(1− x)∂J
∗
∂x
. (B4)
Since we assume that tf is not fixed, the optimal cost function J
∗(x, t) is
independent of t. In other words, we have
∂J∗
∂t
= 0. (B5)
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From Eq. (B4) we then obtain
∂J∗
∂x
= 0 or ∂J
∗
∂x
= −2nc(n−r)(1−x)
x(1−xn)2 . (B6)
Since the per capita incentive u > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1), from Eq. (B3) we
have
∂J∗
∂x
< 0. (B7)
Therefore only ∂J
∗
∂x
= −2nc(n−r)(1−x)
x(1−xn)2 holds. If substituting this equation into
Eq. (B3), we obtain the optimal rewarding strategy u∗P (t) as
u∗P (t) =
2(n− r)c
n
(1− x)
1− xn . (B8)
With the optimal punishing strategy u∗P (t), the dynamical system thus
becomes
x˙ =
(n− r)c
n
x(1− x), (B9)
where the initial condition is x(0) = x0.
After solving Eq. (B9), we finally obtain the solution of x(t) with the
optimal punishing strategy as
x(t) =
1
1 + ( 1
x0
− 1)e− (n−r)cn t
. (B10)
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